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HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS:
TRENDS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
DAVID P. FORSYTHE*
This Article focuses on rights at issue in internal conflicts of a
serious-viz., exceptional-nature. It is thus concerned with the
right of individuals to be protected and assisted in situations of internal armed conflict and other internal situations such as political
troubles and tensions. In addressing this subject, reference will be
made to both human rights in general and human rights in armed
conflict, for both impinge on individuals in internal conflicts.
It is certainly true that human rights in general and human
rights in armed conflict have "evolved along entirely different and
totally separate lines .. ." Since 1945, human rights in general
have been developed mostly through the United Nations and certain regional organizations. Whereas human rights in armed conflict have been developed over the past 125 years with the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as a stimulus
and facilitator. 2 This bifurcated history is reflected in the traditional language used to refer to these two bodies of law. Some
commentators have said that "human rights" pertains only to the
general law and simultaneously refer to rules for victims of armed
conflict as humanitarian or Red Cross law.3 Yet it is increasingly
clear that the two bodies of law share a common concern and similar values; the two can even apply to the same situations. As an
ICRC official has recently written:
* Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska, Lincoln; B.A., Wake Forest
University 1964; M.A., Princeton University 1966; Ph.D., Princeton University 1968. Professor Forsythe is the author of HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD POLITICS: ETHICS, LAW, AND

POWER (1982), and several other books, as well as 22 articles on human rights, the Red Cross
and international relations.
1. Schindler, The InternationalCommittee ofthe Red Cross and Human Rights, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS [hereinafter REVIEW], 5 (No. 208, 1979).

2. Those who write on human rights in general and those who write on human rights
in armed conflict generally do not seek to integrate the two literatures. For a rare effort at
synthesis in addition to Id., see this author's HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD POLITICS,

forthcoming.
3. This traditional distinction is explored in Jacques Moreillon, The FundamentalPrinciples ofthe Red Cross,Peace and Human Rights, REVIEW, supra note 1, at 171-183 (No. 217,
1980).
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The convergence of international humanitarian law and
human rights shows that war and peace, civil wars and international conflicts, international law and internal law, all have increasingly overlapping areas. It follows that the law of war and
the law of peace, international law and internal law, the scopes
of which were at first clearly distinct, are today often applicable
at the same time side by side. Thus, .the Geneva Conventions
and the human rights conventions may often be applied in cumulative fashion. 4

Against the background of human rights in general and
human rights in armed conflict, this Article will explore the following questions: (1) what are modem political trends concerning internal conflict; (2) what are modem legal trends regarding
individual rights in these conflicts; and, (3) what do very recent
events tell us about the politics and law of human rights in internal
conflict.

I.

POLITICAL TRENDS

It is not an overstatement to say that no one knows precisely
what an internal conflict is, as that term is used in this Article. At
what point does domestic politics become exceptional political tension? At one end of the scale it is difficult to distinguish exceptional
conflict from normal domestic politics, since all politics deals with
conflict. At the other end of the spectrum, it is equally difficult to
distinguish civil war from international war. At what point does
foreign involvement in a basically national conflict transform into a
basically international one, as opposed to an internal conflict?
Whether one thinks about historical conflict in Vietnam or recent
conflict in El Salvador, precise definitions are elusive.
Nevertheless, a trend is evident: in modem world politics, internal conflict of an exceptional nature is prevalent. Definitions
and terms vary. Events may be referred to as civil wars, national
emergencies, situations of martial law, domestic instability, riots,
rebellions, insurgencies, terrorism, local uprisings, domestic violence, and so on almost ad infinitum. Despite this varying terminology, it is clear that we are witnessing in the modem world
exceptional internal politics short of full-blown international war.
A quick glimpse of certain political trends makes this obvious.
According to one view on the matter, "[iln the 1960's some
type of violent civil conflict was experienced by 114 of the world's
4. REviEw, supra note 1, at 9.
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121 largest countries and colonies. Since World War II, violent attempts to overthrow governments have been more common than
elections in many parts of the world."5
Others have tried to summarize the trend toward more deadly
internal conflicts:
Luard... speculates that civil wars have become perhaps the
most common of all types of international military activity and
estimates they are almost twice as common in the post-world II
period as in the period between the world wars.
Not only are civil wars commonplace nowadays; they are
also lethal. Taylor and Hudson. . attribute over one million
deaths to domestic violence between 1948 and 1967. Gurr...
notes that ten of the world's thirteen most deadly conflicts in the
past 160 years have been civil wars and rebellions ...
Also noteworthy are the indicators Small and Singer provide of the severity of civil wars. The number of lives lost in civil
violence . . .shows an alarming growth especially since World
War II. Small and Singer note an ominous indicator of this
trend: 13 of the first 15 most severe civil wars were found in the
twentieth century, [and] eight of those 13 were fought since
1946"...

Some of the most deadly civil wars, in short, are the

most recent.6
If one looks at the more dramatic end of the scale of situations
of internal conflict, it can be seen that a number of recent conflicts
comprise to civil wars. In other words, without regard to the labels
put on the situation by those with vested interests, for example the
government or other fighting party, it can be said that a number of
armed conflicts derived from fundamental issues which were originally internal rather than international. According to one source,
the list of such situations from just 1967 to 1975 is comprised of 22
such countries. 7
5.

D. PIRAGES, MANAGING POLITICAL CONFLICT 1 (1976).

6. C. KEGLEY, JR. & E. WIrrrKoPF, WORLD POLITICS 371-72 (1981) [hereinafter cilted
as KEGLEY & WrrTKOPF].

7. F. BEER, PEACE AGAINST WAR 35 (1981). The chart has been abridged and slightly
altered.
Zaire, 1967

Sri Lanka, 1971

Zimbabwe, 1967S. Yemen, 1968
Chad, 1968-72
N. Ireland, 1969
Cambodia, 1970Sudan, 1970-75

Jordan, 1971
N. Vietnam, 1972-73
Burrundi, 1972
Palestine, from 1947
Iraq, from 1945
Cyprus, 1974

Philippines, 1970-76

Lebanon, 1975-6
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If one looks at the less dramatic end of the scale, that is, at
those situations of internal conflict of an exceptional nature closest
to normal domestic politics, we get some idea of the over-all situation from the ICRC. According to that source, between only 1973
and 1978 the ICRC made prison visits "on the occasion of internal
disturbances or tensions . . in many countries and territories."'
To review the political trend under discussion, one can say that
even if definitions are unclear, the political trend is clear. If one
conceives of internal conflict as comprising a range of situations
running from internal tension through internal trouble to internal
war, it can clearly be found that internal conflict is a prevalent part
of contemporary world politics. There is apparently no evidence
indicating that past developments will not continue into the future.
On the contrary, most students of internal conflict believe that the
varying degrees of internal conflict as a form of politics will be
highly salient in the future.9
This political trend means, inter alia, that human rights will be
jeopardized to an exceptional extent. As one source put it, "most
civil wars and revolutions have been savage in their destructiveness, a property that appears to be a characteristic of internal
wars." 10 Internal conflict implies that there will be civilian casualties, that there will be terror and torture (or that there will be private and state terror), that there will be exceptional detention as
well as attacks on prisons, and that food supplies and medical services will be disrupted. In sum, human rights will be in jeopardy.

8.

REVIEW,

Jordan, 1970
Guinea, 1979
Pakistan, 1971
supra note 1, at 213-14 (No.

Africa:

Asia:

E. Timor, 1975Angola, 1975W. Sahara, 1975205, 1978).

Angola (Portuguese), Burundi, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville). Ethiopia, French Territories of the Afars and Issas,
Gambia, Liberia, Mauritania, Mozambique (Portuguese), Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Rwanda, South Africa, Togo, Uganda,
Zambia.
Indonesia, Malaysia, Phillipines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand.

Europe:
Middle East:
Latin America:

Northern Ireland, Portugal, Spain.
Arab Republic of Yemen.
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,
Venezuela.
9. See e.g., R. SIVARD, WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 9 (1980).
10. KEGLEY & WITrKOPF, supra note 6, at 372.
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That condition necessarily raises the question, what international
laws and organizations are at work to protect individual rights in
these situations of internal conflict?
II.

LEGAL TRENDS

Much has been written about the international law of internal
conflict during the past decade. Most of this writing has been concerned with civil war and emergencies threatening the life of the
nation.II Very little has been written on internal troubles and tensions.12 There is even less writing which focuses on the organizations which deal with internal conflict, largely because most
organizations that deal with internal conflict do so as part of a
larger concern. These larger concerns address themselves to human
rights in general, human rights in a region, and human rights in
political conflict. 13 From all of this literature regarding internal
conflict, one can eventually conclude three basic things about international law and organization: (1) the law is terribly complex;
(2) much of the law has not led to adjudication but rather serves as
general guidelines for political and military policy-makers; and,
(3) because the law is complex and backed by a weak system of
control, and because of the depth of feeling generated by internal
conflict as noted in the preceding section of this Article, human
rights are not securely protected in these situations.
In assessing the evidence in support of this over-view, it is useful to break international law down into its two relevant components: The law of human rights in armed conflict and the law of
human rights in general.
A.

The Law of Human Rights in Armed Conflict

As indicated in the opening pages of this Article, one of the
bodies of international law regulating internal conflict is the law of
human rights in armed conflict. This Article will not trace the
11. See e.g., LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD (J. Moore, ed., 1974).
12. The terminology "troubles and tensions" is taken both from law and from the usage
of the ICRC. It is not so generally employed as other terms. The ICRC has attempted to
specify meanings; see the ICRC's ANNUAL REPORT [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT] 42 (1978).
13. A short bibliography on the most crucial organizations might look as follows, in
alphabetical order: J. BOND, THE RULES OF RIOT (1974); D. FORSYTHE, HUMANITARIAN
POLITICS (1977); E. LARSEN, A FLAME IN BARBED WIRE (1979); A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN EUROPE (2nd. ed., 1977); A. SCHREIBER, THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS (1970). This Article deals with organizations mentioned in the law. Thus it
does not treat important, purely NGOs such as Amnesty International.
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evolution of that law here; 14 for present purposes it suffices to note
the following.
In 1949 Common Article 3 was approved as part of the four
Geneva Conventions of that year.' 5 This Article, containing no
definition of its material scope of application, regulated internal
war for the first time in treaty form. It is questionable whether
there is a customary law of internal war. 16 In any event, from 1949
until 1977 Common Article 3 was the only treaty provision in al of
international law which dealt specifically with the legal regulation
of internal war. If there are significant cases adjudicated in international or national law based on this Article, they remain a well kept
secret. While some attention has been given by policy makers to
the Article, Common Article 3 has been less than fully effective. 17
In 1977 two additional Protocols were added to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.'" Three features of these Protocols are especially important for the subject at hand.
First, some situations - seen by a number of parties as internal - are legally defined as international. According to Protocol I,
Article 1(4):
...armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in
the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in
the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Princi-

ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations...

are international armed conflicts. The meaning of this language is
14. A short and standard treatment is by J. PICTET, LE DROIT HUMANITAIRE ET LA
PROTECTION DES VICTIMES DE LA GUERRE (1973).

15. Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, dated at Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362,
75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amerlioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick,
and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, dated at Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, dated at Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75
U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
dated at Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
16. See the argument in support of the proposition in Antonio Cassese, The Spanish
Civil War and the Development of Customary Law Concerning Internal Armed Conflicts, in
CURRENT PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cassese ed. 1975).
17. See Forsythe, Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977 Protocolon Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 272 (1978), and its incorporation into G. VON
GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 608 (4th ed. 1981).

18. U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977). The text of Protocol I and Protocol II is reprinted in 72
AM. J. INT'L L. 457 (1978) and 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977).
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that, for example, if the people of the Republic of South Africa
attempt by armed conflict to fight against the Botha government
which is a racist regime, that struggle is depicted as international
rather than internal.' 9
Second, some situations which are definitely internal armed
conflicts are more extensively regulated. According to Protocol II,
Article l(1), its rules apply to armed conflicts
which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.
This Protocol II contains 28 Articles emphasizing humane treatment for fighters, protection and assistance to the wounded, sick,
and shipwrecked, and protection and assistance to the civilian
population.
Third, some situations which are seen by some parties as being
appropriately regulated by realistic international law, are defined
as outside the scope of Protocol II. According to Protocol II, Article 1(2): "This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of
violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts." This language leaves great room for debate over the relationship between Protocol II and Common Article 321
Without going into a detailed examination of the law of
human rights in armed conflict, one can already see that this body
of law is currently based on a view of political reality which has
four components: international wars, Protocol II situations, Com2
mon Article 3 situations, and internal disturbances and tensions. '
Furthermore, one can see that in order to apply these rules to
the letter of the law, one would have to make difficult and controversial decisions. One could not lightly presume that there would
19. For an extended treatment of this key provision of the law see Forsythe, "The 1974
Dilomatic Conference on HumanitarianLaw: Some Observations, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 77
(1975).
20. See Forsythe, supra note 17. The new Protocol states that it does not change the
field of application of Common Article 3.
21. 1) International Wars, including wars of national liberation (anti-racism, anti-occupation); 2) Protocol II situations, overlapping with, but perhaps not coterminous with, Common Article 3 situations; 3) Common Article 3 situations, which include probably some
situations not covered by Protocol II; 4) Internal Disturbances and Tensions, et. al., which
are not regulated by this body of international law.
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be a consensus on answers to difficult questions.2 2 Suffice it to say
that the complexity of the structure of the law and the complexity
of the language of the law give rise to numerous difficulties.
The problems are compounded by the fact that neither Common Article 3 nor Protocol II provides an automatic process for the
authoritative resolution of disputes. While Protocol II represents a
step forward because it confirms the validity of legal regulation of
internal war and provides more detailed rules about human rights,
it does not satisfactorily address the question of who decides what
the rules require. Law is not only a question of what (substantive
rules), but also of who (procedural rules). With regard to who decides, Protocol II provides no advance beyond Common Article 3.23
In sum to this point, while that body of law known as human
rights in armed conflict attempts to regulate internal armed conflict,
and while Protocol II of 1977 makes important strides in specifying
and thus promoting the rights to be protected in those situations,
there exist obvious problems of application and enforcement. Consequently this Article will look at recent developments since 1977
with regard to this law on human rights. For now one would be on
safe ground in concluding tentatively that the technicalities of Protocol II do not assure the guaranteed protection of human rights.
Governments and other parties have ample leeway to avoid applying the law and meeting itsprimafacie requirements.24
B.

The Law of Human Rights in General

Human rights in general, as a body of law, can also pertain to
22. If armed conflict occurs, is the current regime in Vietnam racist because it tries to
force out ethnic Chinese, or is an African regime racist because it forces out Indians; how
much territory has to be controlled, and for how long, to establish that military opposition to
a government is sustained and concerted, and what exactly constitutes implementation of
Protocol II?
23. See Forsythe, Three Sessions of Legislating Humanitarian Law, II INT'L LAW. 131
(1977).
24. Of course under international treaty law states are not bound unless they give their
explicit consent. My point here is that even when states give their initial and general consent
to be bound by the law, the law is vague enough and without automatic adjudication so that
states still can wiggle out of what they have apparently consented to in general. How to bind
non-state parties in an internal war has long been a problem in an international law intended
primarily for states. There is much literature on the subject, which has not provided sure
guidelines for a political solution. Much current law simply endorses the process whereby a
non-state party declares its intention to act under the law. If a non-state refuses to do so, at
least under the principles of treaty law it remains difficult to understand how such a party
could be obligated to the law by others. One can at least argue that the non-state party is
obligated to make such a declaration under customary legal principles.
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internal conflict. It applies when a State is bound by parts of that
law and does not seek to suspend or supercede that law. Hence, in
situations of internal troubles and tensions, which are said to be
part of "normal" domestic politics, the State is bound by the general human rights provisions to which it is a Party. This Article will
not concern itself with the protection of human rights beyond national emergencies."
1. Substantive Provisions. Under three important human
rights Conventions that comprise an important part of human
rights in general, special laws apply when a State, party to any of
those Conventions, declares a public emergency threatening the life
of the nation. In the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966),26 the European Convention on Human Rights
(1950),27 and the American Convention on Human Rights (1969),28
a similar Article exits. In the UN Convention it is Article 4; in the
European, Article 15; and in the American, Article 27. The basic
format is that, in declared national emergencies, States may derogate from certain of their more general obligations. But some individual rights remain inviolable, for example, the right to life, the
right to freedom from torture and degrading treatment, the right to
freedom from slavery and forced labor, just to name a few.
It is possible, and indeed it has transpired, that a State would
declare a national emergency but not invoke Common Article 3 (or
in the future Protocol II). This situation would leave the emergency clauses from general human rights law as the major international human rights provisions applying to the situation. There are
two well known examples where this situation has occurred: in the
United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) and in Greece under the
junta. Hence internal troubles and tensions, if not kept under general human rights provisions, may be regulated by the emergency
clauses of the above mentioned general human rights conventions.
It is also possible, but it is not clear that it has yet transpired,
that a State would declare a national emergency and also an inter25. See, e.g., the articles in HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, formerly UNIVERSAL HUMAN
RImHTS.
26. Annex to G.A. RES. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
27. 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ.T.S. 5.
28. O.A.S. Official Records OEA/Ser. K/XVI/l.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1, January 7,
1970, 9 I.L.M. 101 (1970), 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 679 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Official
Records].
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nal armed conflict falling under Common Article 3 and/or Protocol
II. In such a situation, both the emergency provisions of general
human rights law and the relevant parts of the law of human rights
,in armed conflict would apply. It is possible to project, for example, that the Duarte government in El Salvador, being bound by
both the American Convention on Human Rights and Protocol II,
might find itself in a situation involving both Article 27 of the former and Protocol II and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Whether the specific rules of emergency law and, of the
Geneva Conventions applicable in internal war are mutually consistent is a question best addressed in another, more technical
Article.
2. ProceduralProvisions. As suggested previously, it is not
only the what of international rules but also the who of procedural
decision-making that is of importance in the protection of human
rights.
With regard to emergency clauses, legally speaking there is not
much to analyze under the UN Political Convention and the American Convention. As is well-known, the UN Political Convention is
supervised or controlled by a Human Rights Committee rather
than by obligatory adjudication. This Committee of individuals,
whose ultimate sanction is negative publicity, is still at the stage of
reviewing State reports and has not yet proceeded to the stage of
trying to control State behavior in emergencies under Article 4 or
otherwise.29
The American Convention has only recently come into legal
force. While it is controlled by both the Inter-American Commision on Human Rights30 and by a newly created Court, the newness
of the legal situation does not permit analysis of protecting human
rights under the Treaty. It is common knowledge, however, that
the Commission has long been active with regard to protecting
human rights in internal conflict.3 ' More recently its scathing reports on the violation of human rights by the Somoza government
in Nicaragua, in a situation eventually and widely recognized as an
internal war, drew considerable attention from interested parties.3 2
29. Ramcharan, The Emerging Juriprudenceof the Human Rights Committee, 6 DALHOUSIE L. J. 7 (1980).
30. Official Records, supra note 28.
31. See e.g., A. SCHREIBER supra note 13.
32. The New York Times reported much attention to a state of war in Nicaragua by
other Latin states. N. Y. Times, June 6, 1979 at 16.
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In other situations of internal conflict the Commission has been active notwithstanding the previous absence of a precise regional
treaty on human rights in force in the Americas."
The European Convention and its emergency clause have received considerable attention under a complicated system of control involving the European Commission on Human Rights, the
European Court of Human Rights, and the European Council of
Ministers." So much has been written about the European situation that this Article will note only the most fundamental points
relevant to the present subject of national emergencies.
When European States have declared national emergencies,
they have not been prone to simultaneously recognizing the applicability of Common Article 3. This approach was true of the British in Northern Ireland and the Greek junta. Additionally, when
states have declared a national emergency, such declarations and
related claims have been scrutinized by the Commission, and at
least once by the Court, at the instigation sometimes of other
states3 5 This is in contradiction to most other human rights treaties36 where States have been noticeably reluctant to petition other
States. Finally the European system for the protection of human
rights has been extant long enough (since 1953) and has been used
frequently enough, that it has promoted a body of case law which
covers considerable details of national emergencies, and has been
utilized by the Commission and Court. Progress to date includes
important rulings of what constitutes torture and degrading treatment in some emergency situations.37
While major problems still remain, demonstrated by the Greek
junta's withdrawal from the Convention and the British government's refusal to provide relevant documents to the Commission,
the European system of regional protection of human rights has
nevertheless shown itself tenacious in supervising internal conflict,
in both the form of national emergencies and other human rights
situations. 38
33. See also L. LEBLANC, THE OAS AND THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (1977).
34. See A. ROBERTSON, supra note 13.

35. Eg., Denmark v. Greece, the Republic of Ireland vs. the United Kingdom.
36. Eg., the United Nations Convention on Racial Discrimination - where states have
been noticeably reluctant to petition other states.

37. O'Boyle, Torture and Emergency Powers under the European Convention on Human
Rights, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 674 (1977).
38. See also Mower, The Implementation of Human Rights Through European Community InstitUtions, UNIVERSAL HUM. RTS, 43-60 (1980).
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Much remains to be written about protection of human rights
and internal conflict under the United Nations, American, and European Conventions. It must be observed that especially under the
UN Political Covenant in force only since 1976, one cannot point to
major accomplishments concerning internal conflict, although the
Covenant has only been in force since 1976. Likewise, and particularly given the nature of politics in Latin America, 39 one cannot be
too sure how the American Convention will fare in the Latin American situation. Such speculations bring us to the question of analyzing recent developments concerning human rights in internal
conflicts.

III.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

It has been iterated thus far that world politics is currently
characterized inter alia by the prevalence of internal conflict. It has
also been seen that a considerable amount of international human
rights law exists that can apply to these situations and that various
organizations try to ensure the implementation of human rights
law.
In order to contribute to an understanding of internal conflict,
it is against this background that one may ask the following questions: what do recent developments demonstrate about the process
or implementing the laws which have been devised? In addition, in
the context of widespread internal conflict and with an awareness
of the relevant treaties and organizations which exist, should one be
optimistic or pessimistic about the politics of protecting human
rights in internal conflict? °
To begin to answer the above questions, one can look at the
salient experiences of the ICRC, an organization of global scope
that is associated with protection of rights in internal war and
which works with political detainees in situations of internal troubles and tensions. 4 ' On the basis of ICRC experiences from 197580, one can commence by trying to fashion an optimistic viewpoint.
39. The point is made in T. BUERGENTHAL & J. TORNEY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIoHTS AND INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION 71 (1976).

40. The implementation will be political in the basic sense that few "cases" will go to
court; the law will be implemented by politicians, bureaucrats, and soldiers.

41. It is always difficult to do research on the ICRC, given that organization's discretion or secrecy. The following is drawn from public, "sanitized" sources. Therefore the
account given here cannot be regarded as final or complete.
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A.

The Optimistic Viewpoint

Protocol II has been accepted by a number of States. By early
1981 sixteen States had adhered to it. Most of these were, contrary
to some expectations, Third World States; some of them were characterized by domestic political fissures that might necessitate invoking the Protocol.42
Additionally, governments and other parties confronting
armed conflict or serious political troubles have declared their acceptance of human rights norms. For example, in 1978 in what was
then Rhodesia, Prime Minister Ian Smith implied that his regime
was "complying with the principles laid down in Article 3 common
to the Geneva Conventions."4 3 In that same year in Chad, fighting
parties acknowledged that an internal armed conflict existed.".
The following year, a number of parties recognized the existence of
an internal armed conflict in Nicaragua4 5 and, in 1980 UNITA, a
fighting party in Angola, declared its acceptance of the norms of the
Geneva Conventions.4 6 Also in 1980, the African National Congress of South Africa declared its acceptance of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol

47
1.

Beyond the question of initial acceptance of human rights
norms, some protection of and assistance for human rights was actually carried out in conjunction with the ICRC. 41 An extensive
number of prison visits to persons detained because of internal war
or political events was carried out by the ICRC. In its publications
the ICRC referred to detainees in internal wars as prisoners of war.
Apparently States did not object. This could be seen as laying the
semantical foundation for extending the rights of international prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 and
under Protocol I of 1977 to combatant detainees in internal armed

conflict.
At times in both Angola and Chad, the ICRC entered into
agreements giving the ICRC extensive rights to over-fly national
42. As of February 1981 the list read as follows: Ghana, Lybia, El Salvador, Ecuador,
Jordan, Botswana, Niger, Yugoslavia, Tunisia, Mauritania, Gabon, Bahamas, Bangladesh,
Laos, Sweden, Finland.
43. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 11 (1978).

44. Id. at 20
45. N.Y. Times June 19, 1979 at 16.
46. REVIEW, supra note 1, at 264 (No. 281, 1980); 320 (No. 219, 1980).
47. REVIEW, supra note 1, at 20 (No. 220, 1980).
48. The ICRC has not provided a recent and analytical overview of this activity, other
than the 1978 account. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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territory in order to carry out humanitarian tasks. In Angola in
1980 the ICRC entered into a written agreement to provide food to
individuals in the "hinterland" of that nation.49 Additionally the
ICRC was working more closely with National Red Cross Societies
regarding the protection of human rights. In the Tansley Report of
1975, officially the Final Report of the Re-appraisal of the Role of
the Red Cross, it had been noted that the overall Red Cross movement was not well integrated and in particular that protection of
human rights could be enhanced by greater cooperation among
Red Cross components."
Since that time the ICRC has shown a closer relationship with
National Societies concerning the dissemination of human rights
principles. 5 It also was trying to identify nations prone to serious
internal conffict in order to improve the "operational capacity" of
the local Red Cross Society.52 In places like Nicaragua the ICRC
has worked tightly with the local National Society in human rights
efforts surplace.

The ICRC seemed to be devoting more practical and systematic efforts to dissemination. Again consistent with recommendations in the Tansley Report, 3 the ICRC was trying to get an
understandable version of the rules of the Geneva Conventions to
soldiers and civilians and to extract the basic rules on human rights
from the legal complexities.54 Seminars on the human rights of
armed conffict were being held for military leaders and others. 55
Situations like the internal war and troubles in Lebanon in the late
1970's had demonstrated the need to get human rights values more
widely accepted by the population at large; the ICRC had understood this clearly and was doing what it could.
The ICRC was showing signs of renewed assertiveness in its
protection and assistance efforts. Despite the policy of the central
government to the contrary, the ICRC declared that it thought
Common Article III. applicable to the Ethiopian province of Eritrea and sent foodstuffs to that area through the Sudan.5 6
49. REVIEW, supra note 1, at 84 (No. 215, 1980); 264 (No. 281 1980).
50. D. TANSLEY, FINAL REPORT 23, 47-52, 67-74 (1975).
51. See e.g., the ANNUAL REPORTS of 1977-79.

52. See e.g., reference to the Society in El Salvador in ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12,
at 36 (1979).

53. Mower, supra note 38, at 69.
54. REVIEW, supra note 1, at 47-49 (No. 206, 1978).

--55. In 1979, for example, the first regional seminar in Latin America took place, and
also the first French-speaking African seminar. See a/so recent ANNUAL REPORTS.
56. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 17 (1978).
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B. The Pessimistic Viewpoint
Protocol II, even with its restricted field of application, had not
been adhered to by the vast number of States. Whereas over 145
states are now parties to the Geneva Conventions, less than twenty
have fully accepted Protocol II. Moreover, no major military
power has adhered to it.
A number of political actors refused to recognize the applicability of international standards of human rights for their adversaries. In Ethiopia, the government refused to admit the relevance of
Common Article III to the area of Eritrea, despite obvious and sustained control of territory and opposition to the central government
by rebel forces. The central government refused to allow the ICRC
to engage in protection and assistance efforts to that area from the
Ethiopian side.57 The ZANU division of the Patriotic Front, led by
Robert Mugabe, refused during the struggle for Zimbabwe to endorse the principles of the Geneva Conventions or to accept a code
of conduct for fighters of ZANU. The Mobutu government of
Zaire refused to admit the applicability of Common Article III to
Shaba Province during 1977.58 Despite long and widespread fighting in the Philipines leading to the displacement of tens of
thousands of civilians,5 9 the Marcos government failed to recognize
the applicability of Common Article III.
Despite some explicit or implied acceptance of the abstract applicability of rules on human rights in armed conflict or in major
internal disturbance, many ICRC efforts to protect human rights
came to nothing. In Chad, for example, despite agreements between the ICRC and political and military leaders to respect
human rights, the ICRC finally had to withdraw from that situation
because even the safety of its delegates could not be guaranteed.6"
In Angola, too, the ICRC had to withdraw for a time because of the
lack of cooperation from various parties.6" In Lebanon, the ICRC
could receive a hearing from highest officials; yet most of its efforts
to trace missing persons received no replies from these authorities.
Of almost 43,000 requests submitted by the Central Tracing
57. In addition to Id., see also REVIEW, supra note 1, at 323 (No. 219, 1980). Ethiopia
permitted the ICRC to visit Somali international prisoners of war, but not Eritrea detainees
under Common Article 3 or otherwise.
58. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 8 (1977).
59. REVIEW, supra note 1, 32 (No. 220, 1981).
60. REVIEW, supra note 1, at 324 (No. 219, 1980).
61. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 7 (1975); 16 (1976); 18 (1977).
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Agency, only about 2,000 received "positive results."62
The actual fighting of internal wars and the actual politics of
internal troubles and tensions showed little advance for human
rights. ICRC delegates and other neutral persons were murdered
in Rhodesia, killed in Nicaragua, shot at in Lebanon. The Red
Cross emblem was the target of military attacks, as were the
wounded supposedly protected by the ensignia. Systematic killing
of unarmed and unresisting individuals occurred in places like Nicaragua and El Salvador. While millions starved in Kampuchea,
various political actors argued over ideology, prestige and national
sovereignty. The Rhodesian "protected villages" or relocation
camps compelled by the government did not even have medical
facilities.
The International Red Cross was not really an organization, as
the Tansley Report had said; it was only a communications network.6 3 In Latin America, for example, the International Red
Cross was much less influential than the Catholic Church in ameliorating the harshness of war and politics. A number of National
Red Cross Societies were extremely weak operationally and in any
event were largely appendages of the Central government-and
therefore incapable of acting impartially to protect rights violated
by the government. Many National Red Cross Societies, including
large and wealthy ones like the American Red Cross, did not even
associate their role with the subject of human rights except in international war.
It was clear that many fighting parties had never heard of the
principles of human rights in war and that civilians could not rely
on such principles for protection. This unreliability was classically
demonstrated by the internal war and related events in Lebanon
from 1975-76. In that situation even summary executions were
widespread.61 It was also clear that the American trained army in
El Salvador and the Soviet trained army in Ethiopia were paying
scant attention to human rights. In the view of general public opinion, human rights in internal conflict remained for the most part an
arcane and academic subject.6"
62.
63.
64.
65.

ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 8 (1977).
Mower, supra note 38, at 45.
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 6 (1976); N.Y. Times June 9, 1976 at I.
The general mood was captured by a journalist writing of the fighting in Lebanon.

Markham, Is thir a civilwar? It is an academic point, though an interesting one, N.Y. Times,

Nov. 9, 1975 (Magazine), at 21.
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IV.

CONCLUSIONS

It has been said that a pessimist is a frustrated optimist. In a
similar vein Michael Waltzer in writing about violence and justice
comments: "War is so awful that it makes us cynical about the
possibility of restraint, and then it is so much worse that it makes us
indignant at the absence of restraint."6' 6 This view is useful as a
step toward summarizing the status -of human rights in internal
conflict.
One can justifiably be cynical about expecting too much from
ruling elites threatened with loss of territory, pride or privilege. After all, as Waltzer reminds us, "'[e]mergency' and 'crisis' are scant
words used to prepare our minds for acts of brutality."6 7 One can
be wary about any restraints being accepted by challenging factions
driven by a sense of injustice or a lust for power. Yet, universally, a
line is drawn. Restraint is demanded. Rights are established. Organizations are created to oversee them. Even as abuses of rights
occur, they are generally perceived as abuses. Hence there is progress in the face of brutality. It goes too far, and it is seen to go too
far, to employ torture and murder in Lebanon, systematically slay
young males in Nicaragua, and to rape and kill nuns and social
workers in El Salvador.
That atrocities reoccur in a historical fact. That one is pessimistic about improvement indicates the staying power of humane
expectations against which behavior is measured. We are pessimists and optimists at the same time.
Telford Taylor in his writings on justice and violence kept to a
middle position in evaluating human rights and wrongs. The effect
of the law of human rights in war, he reminds us, is that, "[ilf it
were not regarded as wrong to bomb military hospitals, they would
be bombed all of the time instead of only some of the time."6 This
view provides a second step toward summarizing the trends and
events reviewed in this Article. The recent developments involving
the ICRC demonstrate reasons for both optimism and pessimism,
and hence ultimately for a middle position. Progressive efforts are
accompanied by lacunae in protection. Some starvation and inhumane detention are successfully countered, while some persons hors
de combat-including ICRC delegates-are deliberately shot.
66. M.

WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS

46 (1977).

67. Id. at 251.
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On balance then, the development since 1945 of numerous
laws on human rights and the continued functioning of organizations devoted to their implementation remind us of how far human
rights has come. The work of the European Commission on

Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
the International Committee of the Red Cross, is testimony to what
can be achieved. But each time a government refuses to apply
Common Article III and Protocol II, each time it refuses access to
the ICRC for prison visits, each time it or a private army permits
the starvation and malnutrition of civilians under its control, one is
reminded of how far we have to go.
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